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PRESERVING THE COLLATERAL SouRCE RULE:
MODERN THEORIES OF TORT LAW AND A
PROPOSAL FOR PRACTICAL APPLICATION

INTRODUCTION

The collateral source rule1 has long been a mainstay of American tort law. Recently, however, the traditional tort system has
undergone tremendous scrutiny. Specifically, the collateral source
rule has been criticized by commentators and scholars for conflicting with modem purposes of tort liability and the tort system in
general.2 This criticism prompted many state legislatures to change
the rule. In Ohio, for example, the Supreme Court recently struck
down the Legislature's attempt to do away with the rule.3 Based
on the criticism the rule has received and the fervor with which
tort plaintiffs and their attorneys cling to the traditional rule, it is
clear that the rule has important implications for all parties participating in the tort system and for those attempting to redesign it.
This Note concludes that the collateral source rule should be
retained. The history and traditional justifications of the collateral
source rule are reviewed in Part I. More recent criticism of the
traditional rule from scholars and commentators who disagree about
the relative importance of these justifications, as well as the resulting legislative and judicial activity,4 are discussed in Part II. Parts
Ill-V discuss three separate justifications of the tort system that

1. Generally, the collateral source rule allows an insured tort plaintiff to retain both
insurance benefits from an insurer and full damages from the defendant. See infra notes
5-8 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.

3. See infra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
4. Ohio is used as an example of this activity. The experience in Ohio is fairly representative of the legislative reforms and litigation regarding the statutory changes that
have been occurring throughout the United States and should give the reader a flavor for
the controversy.
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support retaining the rule. These justifications include proper allocation of tort-caused losses, deterrence of risky behavior, and compensation for injuries. This Note argues that taken together these
analyses will support retaining the rule.
While allowing a plaintiff to retain both insurance benefits and
tort damages may produce inefficiencies of double payment, this
Note proposes, in conjunction with retaining the traditional collateral source rule, that the practice of subrogation or reimbursement of
the insurer out of the tort damages should be used more often and
more efficiently as a method of decreasing any duplicitous recovery
by the injured plaintiff. After discussing broad proposals for increasing the use and efficiency of subrogation/reimbursement practices in Part VI, this Note concludes that the collateral source rule
can still be an important part of the tort recovery system.
I. BACKGROUND
The collateral source rule provides that "if an injured person
receives compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent [collateral] of the tort-feasor, the payment should not be
deducted from the damages which he would otherwise collect from
the tort-feasor."5 In other words, an injured plaintiff in a tort action can recover twice, from his own insurance policy and from
the defendant. The rule has both damages and evidentiary aspects.
First, as noted above, the damages aspect is that benefits received
by the plaintiff from other sources are not credited or set-off
against the tortfeasor's liability.6 Second, since "the receipt of collateral benefits is deemed irrelevant and immaterial on the issue of
that the redamages, it follows, as a necessary concomitant ...
ceipt of such benefits is not to be admitted in evidence, or otherwise disclosed to the jury."7 The jury is not permitted to hear this
information in order to foreclose any improper inferences as to the
amount of damages or the liability of the defendant.8

5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (6th ed. 1990).

6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1977).
7. Pryor v. Webber, 263 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ohio 1970). But see Joel K. Jacobsen, The
Collateral Source Rule and the Role of the Jury, 70 OR. L. REv. 523, 525-26 (1991)
(arguing that rote categorization of the rule as both a damages and evidence rule is unnecessary and confusing and that evidence of collateral benefits should be admissible
when offered for purposes other than reducing damages).
8. See Pryor, 263 N.E.2d at 239.
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The history of the collateral source rule in the United States is
often traced to The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison.9 Monticello
was a Supreme Court admiralty case in which the defendant-steamship raised as a defense that the plaintiff-schooner, rammed and
sunk by the steamship, had been insured and fully compensated."
The Court, effectively espousing the collateral source rule, affirmed
the circuit court's holding denying this defense and stated that the
defendant cannot avail himself of the benefit of the plaintiff's
insurance "wager."" The Court explained that it was merely stating a rule that was well established at common law. 2
The rule's vitality continued in the United States and has been
established in almost every state. 3 In Ohio, the leading case is
Pryor v. Webber. 4 In Pryor, the defendant attempted to introduce
into evidence wages received by the plaintiff from her employer
while she was injured. 5 The court reaffirmed Ohio's adherence to
the collateral source rule and held that the evidence was inadmissi16
ble.
Although the collateral source rule may have originated as an
evidentiary or damages rule, other justifications have been offered
by modem courts and scholars to explain its continued use. First,
the wrong-doing tortfeasor should not be allowed to benefit, or be
relieved of liability, due to the plaintiff's foresight in obtaining
insurance. 7 If the defendant is found liable to the plaintiff for
damages, then offsetting the insurance benefits against the damages
is a boon to the defendant.
Second, if a tort recovery made after insurance benefits are
received is considered a windfall to the plaintiff, it is preferable to

9. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854).
10. See id. at 154.
11. See id.at 155.
12. See id.
13. See Linda J. Gobis, Note, Lambert v. Wrensch: Another Step Toward Abrogation
of the Collateral Source Rule in Wisconsin, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 857, 860.
14. 263 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio 1970).
15. See id. at 238 (explaining that the defendant's relevance theory was that the plaintiff had lied about her true damages since she was "compensated" for her injuries by her

disability wages).
16. See id. at 243.
17. See Gobis, supra note 13, at 862. But see Lawrence P. Wilkins, A Multi-Perspective Critique of Indiana'sLegislative Abrogation of the Collateral Source Rule, 20 IND. L.
REV. 399, 401-02 (1987) (arguing that there is no logical reason that a third-party cannot
benefit from the plaintiffs insurance contract and only a court's moral opposition to giving a benefit to a wrong-doer prevents such a result).
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18
giving the defendant a windfall by relieving him of liability.
Since the tortfeasor is the more culpable party and was merely
lucky to injure an insured victim, the windfall should not go to the
tortfeasor.
Third, permitting recovery from both the plaintiff's insurer and
the defendant is favored since money cannot truly compensate for
physical injuries or pain incurred.19 Since the injured party's damages are only a guess by the insurance company or jury, additional
recovery protects against low estimates.
Fourth, the insurance company and the plaintiff previously
contracted for the payment of these benefits. The insurer has a
duty to pay the benefits and the plaintiff has a right to the benefits
regardless of the plaintiff's ability to recover from a third-party
tortfeasor.2" Since the insurance company has already been paid
premiums to bear an actuarial risk, the benefit payments it must
make are simply a cost of doing business that has already been
contracted and paid for by the plaintiff.
Lastly, unless the defendant is made to pay for the damages
caused, the deterrent purposes of tort liability2' will be undermined.2 2

II. RECENT HJSTORY
Despite its deeply ingrained roots in American common law,
the collateral source rule has been criticized by commentators and

18. See Christopher J. Eaton, Comment, The Kansas Legislature's Attempt to Abrogate
the Collateral Source Rule: Three Strikes and They're Out?, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 913,
920 (1994).
19. See id.; Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (stating that compensatory damages do not really compensate since a person would not be willing to sell
a body part). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 6.11-.12 (3d
ed. 1986) (discussing the need to estimate damages and stating that all damages are measurable in an economic sense).
20. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 531-32 (expressing this argument as the benefit-ofthe-bargain rationale). The agreement between the insurer and the insured may also have
provided the insurer with subrogation rights to the plaintiff's claim against the defendant,
in which case the insurer would have priority to the damages received from the defendant. Subrogation is discussed more fully at infra notes 139-195 and accompanying text
and is proposed as part of the solution to the collateral source rule debate.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c) (1977) (stating that one of the
purposes of tort damages is to "punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct").
22. See Eaton, supra note 18, at 920 (stating that to allow evidence of collateral benefits to reduce a tortfeasor's liability would lessen the deterrent effect that civil liability
offers).
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scholars. The rule is said to have evolved from opposing theories
of tort law,' and has been called a high-ranking oddity of accident law.24 One of the most frequent objections to the collateral
source rule is that the plaintiff should not receive a fortuitous
double-recovery simply for being the victim of tortious conduct
and receiving insurance benefits at the same time.' Since an important purpose of tort compensation is to indemnify only the harm
suffered by the victim,' this double-recovery would overcompensate the plaintiff and put him in a better position than before the
tort occurred.' A serious implication of a double-recovery for the
plaintiff is that it could produce a moral hazard.' If the plaintiff
were to receive a double-recovery, the plaintiff would have incentive to become a tort victim; certainly this is an incentive society
would not want to promote.
Another argument against the collateral source rule is that it is
too rooted in a punitive or deterrence theory of tort liability.29
The importance and efficacy of the deterrent impact of tort liability
has been hotly debated for many years.3" Relying on the argument
that tort liability does not affect human behavior and deter unsafe
conduct, opponents of the collateral source rule consider deterrence
a weak justification.31 In addition, mitigating factors such as liability insurance and the inability of tort liability to deter inadvertent conduct, may dull the deterrent impact of tort liability.32
23. See Julie A. Schafer, Note, The Constitutionality of Offsetting Collateral Benefits
Under Ohio Revised Code Section 2317.45, 53 011o ST. LJ. 587, 589 (1992) (arguing
that the compensation and deterrence goals of tort law are irreconcilable).
24. See John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort
Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1478, 1478 (1966).
25. See Schafer, supra note 23, at 590.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 901(a) (1977) (stating that tort damages
exist "to give compensation, indemnity, or restitution for harms").
27. See Schafer, supra note 23, at 590.
28. See ROBERT E. KEsrON & ALAN . Winiss, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRNCIPLES, LEGAL Docrnus AND COMMRCiL. PRACnCES § 3.1(C) (Practitioner's ed. 1988) (describing that if an insured could realize a net gain from insurance, it
would encourage using insurance as a way of wagering).
29. See Eaton, supra note 18, at 922 (stating that tort law should focus on the injury
and not on deterring unsafe behavior).
30. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381-387 (1994) (providing a comprehensive
list of recent authors who doubt the deterrent effect of tort liability and the factors they
suggest mitigate deterrence).
31. See Eaton, supra note 18, at 922; Gobis, supra note 13, at 885 (stating that the
deterrent effect of the collateral source rule is "speculative" and "unrealistic").
32. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 381-87; see also infra notes 84-92 and accompa-
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These theoretical arguments pale in comparison to the arguments of the insurance industry. Industry analysts argued that the
collateral source rule's double recovery for plaintiffs was a contributing factor to the liability insurance availability and affordability
crises in this country in the early to mid-1980s.33 The collateral
source rule is an easy target for insurance company lobbyists due
to the windfall nature of a double recovery and increasing public
indignation of highly-publicized jury verdicts.34 Based on the perceived need for a solution to this crisis, many state legislatures
passed comprehensive tort reform packages in the latter half of the
1980s. Statutory elimination of the collateral source rule in some

form was a common factor among these different packages.35

nying text.
33. See REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRIsIs IN INsuRANcE AvAmABILrIY AND
AFFORDABILITY 1, 4, 70, 80 (Feb. 1986) (recommending that the collateral source rule be
abolished). But see Leonard W. Schroeter & William J. Rutzick, "Tort Reform"--Being an
Insurance Company Means Never Having to Say You're Sony, 22 GoNz. L. REV. 31
(1987) (providing an impassioned rebuttal of the actual existence of an insurance crisis in
this country and accusing the insurance industry of perpetrating a fraud on the public in
order to persuade legislative officials to pass beneficial tort reform legislation and justify
large premium increases). Determining whether a crisis existed in the insurance industry
during the 1980s is beyond the scope of this Note and may be impossible in any case.
There are persuasive arguments and statistics on each side. Regardless of the outcome of
this debate, basing statutory reforms on controversial and inconsistent data is questionable
at best, and partisan politicizing at worst. A more rational and conservative approach, with
deference to common law traditions and in conjunction with more efficient loss cost recovery as this Note suggests, is a better policy.
34. It is important to note that the traditional collateral source rule only provides a
double recovery for the economic damages portion of the award. First-party medical insurance does not cover non-economic damages such as pain and suffering and punitive damages. Since the plaintiff would retain these types of damages from a jury verdict if there
was no collateral source rule, the double recovery argument should be separated from the
recoil against high punitive or intangible damage awards. It is true, however, that the
collateral source rule could provide multiple recoveries of economic damages if the victim
was insured by more than one insurer for the same injury. This is a coordination of
benefits problem with the insurance policies which would occur even if the victim did not
enter the tort system. This problem would occur, for example, if the victim had both
medical insurance and a personal injury rider on his automobile insurance policy. See
KEETON & WEDiss, supra note 28, at § 3.11(d) (indicating that many health insurance
policies do not limit coverage based on excess insurance carried by the insured).
35. See CAL. CF!. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76
(West Supp. 1996); see also 4 FOwLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 219-22
(2d ed., 1996 Cum. Supp. No. 1, 1986) (providing a more complete summary of states
with statutorily modified collateral source rules); Schafer, supra note 23, at 608 n.99.
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The Ohio Legislature passed a comprehensive tort reform bill

in 1987.36 The purpose of the bill was "to make changes in civil
justice and insurance law, thereby reducing the causes of the cur'
rent insurance crisis and preventing future crises."37
This Bill
changed Ohio's common law collateral source rule; it required
courts to subtract collateral benefits received by the plaintiff from
compensatory damages awarded by the jury.3" The new law required the plaintiffs to disclose collateral benefits to the court at
the conclusion of the trial. Such benefits were then subtracted from
the compensatory damage verdict.39
In addition to helping solve the liability insurance crisis, the
change in the common law collateral source rule was "designed to
prevent double recovery" by a plaintiff.' Not surprisingly, with
potentially large verdicts and attorney fees at stake, this new rule
generated much litigation in Ohio courts.4 ' Although the state
courts of appeal consistently held R.C. Section 2317.45 to be constitutional, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to grant review to such
a case in 1994.42

36. Am. Sub. H.B. 1, 117 G.A., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1987-88).
37. Id.
38. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.45 (Banks-Baldwin 1994). The pertinent text of
§ 2317.45(B)(2)(c) is as follows:
(c)Prior to entering judgment for the plaintiff, [the court shall] do both of the
following:
(i) Subtract from the compensatory damages that the plaintiff otherwise
would be awarded the amount of any disclosed collateral benefits ...
§ 2317.45(B)(2)(c).
39. See § 2317.45(B)(2)(c). Placing the hearing at the conclusion of the trial makes a
concession to the evidentiary concerns created if the defendant was allowed to present
evidence of the plaintiff's collateral benefits to the jury. See § 2317.45(B)(3) (stating that
evidence of collateral benefits is not admissible before the trier of fact). Also, the statute
recognized that the plaintiff may have paid for the collateral benefits and allowed for a
reduction in the offsets for premiums paid for the insurance coverage. See §
2317.45(B)(2)(c)(ii). The setoff statute does not apply to collateral benefits which are
subject to "rights of recoupment" or subrogation claims by an insurer. See §
2317.45(B)(2)(a)(ii) & (B)(2)(b). This would allow an insurer to recover the benefits it
had paid to the insured. See also infra notes 139-157 and accompanying text (discussing
subrogation).
40. See STANTON G. DARUNG I1, OtnO CtVI. JusncE REFORM Acr 131 (1987) (providing interpretations and legislative history commentary on the entire tort reform act).
Darling served as special advisor on tort and civil justice matters to the Office of the
Speaker of the House in 1987 and drafted much of House Bill 1.
41. See Schafer, supra note 23, at 597-607 (describing Ohio cases dealing with these
new statutes).
42. See Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio 1994).
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In Sorrell, the plaintiff suffered back injuries when the defendant jokingly grabbed her from behind while she was bent over

sweeping

dirt into

a

dust

pan.43

The

plaintiff had

re-

ceived $14,335 in worker's compensation benefits as a result of her
injury.' At trial the plaintiff was awarded $1,700 for lost wages,
$3,428 for medical expenses, and $5,000 for pain and suffering.4'
Following the trial, the court held a hearing to determine the
amount of collateral benefits to be used to offset the jury award.46
Theoretically, the jury verdict would have been totally offset by the
worker's compensation benefits which were higher than the verdict;
Ms. Sorrell would have received nothing. At the hearing, the
plaintiff argued that the collateral source setoff was unconstitutional.4 The trial court agreed and declared the statute unconstitutional. 49
The Court of Appeals reversed.5" The Supreme Court, in
turn, reversed the Court of Appeals and declared the statute unconstitutional on a number of grounds."' It is interesting that the

43. See Sorrell v. Thevenir, No. 91 CA 4, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 5098, at *2 (Gallia
Cty. Sept. 30, 1992).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at *2-*3.
47. In fact, the defendant, only partially in jest, suggested that Ms. Sorrell owed him
and his attorneys the difference between the judgment and her worker's compensation
benefits. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1-2, Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504
(Ohio 1994) (No. 91-CA-04).
48. See Sorrell v. Thevenir, No. 91 CA 4, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 5098, at *3 (Gallia
Cty. Sept. 30, 1992).
49. See id.
50. See id. at *10. The Court of Appeals emphasized that they were not passing on
the legislative wisdom of the statute, but rather relying on Supreme Court precedent approving a similar collateral source setoff statute for medical malpractice claims. See id.
(citing Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991) (upholding R.C. § 2305.27 under
state constitutional equal protection and due process attack)). The court also welcomed
Supreme Court review of the issue in this case. See id.
51. See Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 510-513 (Ohio 1994) (R.C. § 2317.45
restricts the right to a jury trial, does not provide due process of law to tort victims, is
constitutionally infirm on equal protection grounds, and hinders the plaintiff's rights to a
remedy and to an open court). Other state courts have also declared collateral source
setoff statutes to be unconstitutional on similar grounds. See, e.g., Denton v. Con-Way S.
Express, Inc., 402 S.E.2d 269 (Ga. 1991) (striking down GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-1
(1987), an evidentiary abolition of the collateral source rule, as violating the Georgia
Constitution's impartial and complete protection of person and property). But see Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal.) (upholding CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1
(Michie Supp. 1995) as not violating medical malpractice plaintiff's due process or equal
protection rights), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 982 (1985).
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Court vowed to ignore policy implications of the statute and to
refrain from debating the wisdom of the legislature's action. 2 In
fact, the Court's opinion is scattered with references to policy
justifications for and against the collateral source rule. 3 The
Court simply ignored its own limitation, and proceeded to base its
decision on policy grounds. Whether or not the Sorrell court improperly invaded a legislative policy-making domain is an important question, however, its answer is beyond the scope of this
Note.
This type of judicial opposition to changes in the traditional
rule shows that the debate is still open at the state level. If state
legislatures pursue this type of tort reform measure, they must
decide whether or not to redraft a change to the common law rule
that will satisfy the court's constitutional requirements. Although
legislative activity on this count has been minimal,54 it is quite
possible that the liability insurance industry, given its cyclical
nature," will find itself in another investment return/premium
competition squeeze. When that happens, industry lobbyists will

52. See Sorrell, 633 N.E.2d at 508 (stating that the Court's duty is merely to determine the constitutionality of the statute as an exercise of legislative power).
53. The plaintiff may not be fully compensated if required to offset the verdict with
collateral benefits. See id. at 510. The tortfeasor is granted a windfall if he does not have
to pay for the damages he caused. See id. The collateral source setoff statute may or may
not ease the liability insurance crisis. See id. at 511. The statute prevents the plaintiff
from receiving a double recovery. See id. The plaintiff has a right to both the insurance
proceeds and the verdict damages since the insurance benefits were previously bargained
for. See id. at 511-12. The dissenting judge argued that this holding ignores the underlying purpose of the tort system to only compensate the victim for the amount of damages
or the amount the jury deems a just and appropriate reward. See id. at 513 (Moyer, CJ.,
dissenting).
54. In Ohio, the State House of Representatives revised the setoff statute as part of the
1995 Tort Reform Package. H.B. 350, (A) § 2317.45 (Ohio 1995). The much abbreviated
provision simply allows both plaintiff and defendant to present evidence to the jury of
premiums paid to and benefits received from a collateral source. See § 2317.45. The
House intended to do away with the common law rule and address the Sorrell court's
constitutional objections to the previous setoff statute. See comments to H.B. 350 at (E).
The new version did not survive the committee hearings and the House eventually passed
a bill that only allows the defendant to introduce evidence of insurance benefits for which
the plaintiff did not pay a premium. See AM. SUB. H.B. 350, (A) § 2317.45; Catherine
Candisky, House Passes Measure: Tort Reform, THE COLUMBUs DIsPATcH, Feb. 8, 1996,
at IC. The bill was finally sent to Governor George Voinovich, who indicated he would
sign it, on September 26, 1996. See Thomas Suddes, House OK's Bill to Cap PersonalInjury Awards, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 27, 1996, at 5B.
55. See Schroeter & Rutzick, supra note 33 (describing previous instances of insurance
crises which prompted insurance companies' efforts at tort reform).
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surely knock down state house doors across the country clamoring
for relief just as they did in the 1980s. It is likely that changes to
the traditional collateral source rule will be part of the relief measures offered if the rule has not yet been modified.
If a state legislature considers a collateral source setoff statute,
more careful thought should be given to the justifications for and
against the traditional rule than has been given in the past. Clearly,
the current collateral source rule debate is too simple, short-sighted,
and partisan. The opposing sides, divided right down plaintiff-defendant party lines,56 either favor the traditional rule or condemn
it with wholly self-interested views
The plaintiffs want what
they think is rightfully theirs, and the defendants want to avoid
paying damages to a previously compensated plaintiff. The debate
has lost sight of the reasons why the traditional rule developed-to
foster and enhance the purpose of the tort system as it existed at
the time of the development of the common law rule.5" In order
to reach a resolution, it must be determined whether the collateral
source rule performs or does not perform a similar function under
our current tort system.59
This Note extends the debate past the narrow party-minded
arguments toward a more positive analysis of whether the rule is
supported by modem theories of tort law and whether the rule has
a place in the tort system. Three major justifications of the tort
system found in the recent literature define the analysis: (1) risk
allocation/loss-spreading; (2) deterrence; and (3) compensation.
A conclusion that the collateral rule does not magically fit all
of the justifications given for tort liability does not require that it
be dismissed as out-dated. It must be determined whether the costs

56. The party becomes more complicated when insurers, attorneys, lobbyists,
and activist courts are added.
57. See supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text (discussing the standard
for and against the collateral source rule).
58. See Kenneth S. Abraham, What is a Tort Claim? An Interpretation of
rary Tort Reform, 51 MD. L. REV. 172, 192-93 (1992) (hypothesizing that the

legislators,
arguments
Contemporule origi-

nated when insurance was an uncommon phenomenon in order to ensure those prudent
enough to purchase insurance the receipt of their benefits, but also stating that increased
insurance coverage may have changed the need for the rule).
59. The question may be posed this way: if there were no collateral source rule, given
the current state of the tort system and the goals which it achieves or we wish it could
achieve, would we create a rule similar to the common law rule to enhance the purposes
of the tort system?
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associated with the traditional collateral source rule are outweighed
by the benefits.
III. RISK ALLOCATION & SCALE OF AcrivrrY
Many justifications for the tort system focus on the actions of
the tortfeasor and the deterrent effect of tort liability.'" The most
common concept of deterrence is whether the threat of liability
prevents an individual or firm from engaging in risky behavior.6 '
This section of the Note will discuss a less common concept
termed "scale of activity" deterrence.62 It is clear that a goal of
tort liability is to optimize, not eliminate, risky behavior.63 Some
risky behavior is considered valuable by our society even if it
results in damages. The difficulty lies in determining what level of
risky behavior is socially optimal. The amount or level of risky
behavior being measured is called the scale of an activity.
Many law and economics scholars believe that an optimal
scale of activity can be more closely attained by the use of tort
liability. Guido Calabresi terms the determination of the optimal
level of risky behavior the "allocation of resources" justification of
tort liability." His thought was that if society wants certain
goods, then obstacles to production should be overcome, and the
goods should be produced.' To enable society to make the optimal choice between the desirable goods or activities and the risks
associated with them, the full cost of producing the good or engaging in the activity must be included in the price society pays for
that good or activity. These costs include the normal cost of inputs
such as labor and materials, as well as the damages caused by

60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901A (1977) (listing "deterrence of
tortfeasor" as one purpose of the tort system).
61. See infra Section IV, notes 77-116 and accompanying text.
62. Guido Calabresi calls these different aspects specific deterrence and general deterrence respectively. See GuiDo CALABREsI, THE CoSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYsis 131-97 (1970) [hereinafter CALABRESI, TI COSTS OF ACCaDENTs].
63. See WaLLAM M. LANDEs & RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUcruRE OF
TORT LAW 13 (1987).

64. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE LJ. 499, 502 (1961) [hereinafter Calabresi, Thoughts on Risk Distribution]; see
also Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV.
772, 793-819 (1985) (quoting extensively from Calabresi's works and applying the theory
to his discussion on the tort system's mechanisms for dealing with intangible or non-pecuniary injuries).
65. See Calabresi, Thoughts on Risk Distribution, supra note 64, at 502.
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producing the good or engaging in the activity. If the value to
society of a particular good or activity is equal to or more than the
cost of production, then production or activity will increase and
society will pay for it. If the value to society is less that the cost
of production, including damages, then production or activity will
decrease. This function of price, reflecting full cost, is an important
component of society's choice of whether to buy the good or engage in the activity.'
Clearly, the only way that the full cost can be reflected in the
price is if the producer must pay for damages caused by the production of the good or activity. If the producer is monetarily liable,
then the price charged to consumers will reflect this liability so
that the producer can cover the costs of production. If the price of
the good does not reflect damages caused, as would be the case if
the producer is not monetarily liable for damages caused, then
society will buy more of a good or engage in more of an activity.67 Since society's demand for a good or activity has increased
due to the lower than optimal price, the producer will respond by
increasing the supply of the good or activity above the socially
optimal level.
More recently, Steven Shavell has shown that if an injurer is
not liable for the damages he causes, he will over-engage in an
activity.68 Since the injurer, in the absence of liability, does not
have to pay for the damages caused or expend his own resources
to try to prevent accidents from occurring, theoretically, he could
engage in a dangerous activity without thinking about its consequences. 69
The traditional collateral source rule correctly places the monetary liability for damages caused due to wrongful behavior on the
injuring party.70 According to Calabresi and Shavell, if the full
66. See id.
67. This above- or below-optimal purchasing is an inefficiency introduced by the externalization of the cost of the damages from the producer to the consumers. See
CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 62, at 70.
68. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 21-32 (1987).

Actually, in the absence of liability, the injurer will engage in an activity up to the point
where additional activity is actually a burden on the injurer. See id. at 22 n.29. Shavell's
level of activity analysis is similar to the situation where a firm engages in the production of goods and is sensitive to consumer demand based on price levels. See id. at 49.
69. In the case of a firm producing a level of goods in response to consumer demand,
the firm could still produce goods without giving thought to the injuries or damages
caused up to the point where the supply of the good is still met by consumer demand.
70. A no-fault automobile insurance plan, see generally ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY
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cost of the damages caused by the activity or production of goods
is not reflected in the price or borne by the injuring party, then too
much activity will be engaged in or too many goods will be produced. The collateral source rule places the cost of damages on the
injuring party so that it is reflected in the cost of the good. If the
collateral source rule did not apply in tort liability cases, then the
injuring party would not be fully liable for the damages.7 ' There
would then be no reason for the monetary liability to be reflected
in the cost of the good produced.

The scale of activity or allocation of resources argument for
imposing tort liability on the injurer is not without its critics.72
Stephen Sugarman argues that these theories are not strong enough
to justify retaining tort liability. His most compelling objection is
that simply internalizing the costs of torts may not lead to a more
efficient allocation of resources.7 3 This uncertainty stems from the
economic theory of "second-best." 74 As applied to the allocation
of tort liability, this theory suggests that simply making one allocation of cost, based on fault or damage causation, has an unpredictable effect on the optimal level of production due to the many
other economic factors that are simultaneously affecting the level

O'CONNELi, BAsIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIc ViCTm (1965) (describing the objectives of the automobile claims system), allocates the cost of the activity without using
fault as a criterion for the allocation of damages. See CALABRESl, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 62, at 7-10. However, no-fault insurance is designed to provide firstparty compensation in accidents where both parties are usually involved in the same activity. In that special case, the allocation of damages is de facto placed correctly on the
injury causing activity, driving. In a more general tort case, however, if the victim was
not also participating in the same activity as the injurer, or was simply a consumer of
goods, then allocating damage costs to a victim under a no-fault type compensation plan
would not correctly allocate the costs to the activity that caused the damages.
71. In the simplest case, with the plaintiff incurring only medical costs and lost wages,
a collateral benefit setoff rule would result in a 100% setoff of tortfeasor liability because
of benefits received by the plaintiff. The effect of the rule, then, is no liability.
72. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV.
555, 613-16 (1985) (arguing additionally that the allocation of resources argument may be
confused with other justifications for tort liability; that it may not fully consider the proper allocation of damages from accidents which are truly nobody's fault; that its purpose
may be defeated by the self-externalizing function of insurance premiums; and that the
inherent inefficiency of tort damages in correctly allocating costs may destroy any
allocative benefits from assigning tort liability).
73. See id. at 615.
74. See Richard S. Markovits, Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of First-BestAllocatively-Efficient Tort Law in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: Some Whys and
Some Therefores, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 313, 316-17 (1996) (defining the "second
best" theory).
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of production. Changing one factor in the mix in an attempt to
improve the situation may actually worsen it, since the interplay of
other factors with the changed factor is not known.75
Although the argument is a potentially serious consideration
for the debate over whether to retain tort law liability at all, it
does not damage the allocative argument to retain the collateral
source rule in our current tort liability system. That is so since the
collateral source rule debate is practicably limited to the world
where no drastic or overwhelming changes will be made in the
fault-based system through which tort victims are compensated.
Since that system is unlikely to change,76 the allocative argument
for retaining the rule operates within the framework of the current
fault-based system. Sugarman's "second-best" theory on tort liability does not extend to this framework; it is limited to the broader
question of whether tort liability should be retained.
Within a fault-based framework, the "second-best" theory does
not indicate that the collateral source rule distorts the level of
production. Keeping the cost of accidents on the injurer via the
collateral source rule will not result in a more drastic distortion in
the allocation of resources than those distortions that already occur
in the tort liability system. In fact, in choosing between placing
full liability on the injurer under the traditional rule or in reducing
liability under a setoff statute, the theory of "second-best" would
imply that it would be difficult to determine which allocation is
more efficient. It is possible that reducing tort liability to the extent of collateral benefits may distort the allocation to the same
extent as imposing full liability.
For the scale of activity rationale to be effective in helping
society choose the optimal level of goods to produce or activity to
engage in, the traditional collateral source rule should be retained.
Without the collateral source rule, injuring parties and producers of
goods will engage in too much dangerous activity or produce too
many dangerous goods. In turn, this would increase the injuries
and damages beyond the optimal level that society, if given the

75. See id.
76. If drastic changes were made, such as a conversion to an all-encompassing government social insurance for accidents or to an entirely no-fault based system for all tort
accidents, the collateral source rule would almost by definition be unnecessary or unworkable.
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choice, would select through pricing and supply/demand mechanisms.
IV. DETERRENCE OF UNSAFE BEHAVIOR
Many commentators contend that because the deterrence purpose of tort liability has faded in importance, it is also no longer a
supportable justification for the continued use of the collateral
source rule.7 The deterrence justification for tort liability has
been revived recently, however, through the law and economic
positivist analysis.7 8 For this reason, it is difficult for these commentators and litigants to continue to maintain that deterrence has
no scholarly support as a purpose of the tort system or the collateral source rule.
The difficulty in determining whether the deterrence theory is
a valid justification is that there are persuasive theoretical arguments both for and against the efficacy of this theory. Additionally,
the actual deterrent impact of tort liability is difficult to measure in
any satisfactory empirical fashion. Early attempts at empiricism
were often apocryphal investigations into the impact of a few celebrated cases. The later attempts at investigating the impact of liability have been more structured and scientific, but even these
studies have been criticized.7 9 Even so, if it is accepted that deterrence still plays a role in the tort system, then abolishing the collateral source rule will certainly decrease the deterrent impact of
tort liability and lead to a higher than optimal level of risky behavior. As explained below, the setoff of liability by collateral benefits
will fully or partially reduce the deterrent effect of tort liability.
Deterrence of risky behavior may not by itself justify preserving
the traditional rule. As this Note argues, however, in combination
with the allocation of resources and compensation arguments, plus
more efficient subrogation, an increase in the deterrence of risky

77. See Eaton, supra note 18, at 922 (stating that none of the mainstream theories of
human behavior support the likelihood that tort sanctions appropriately deter unsafe behavior); Gobis, supra note 13, at 885 (explaining that increased defendant liability is a speculative deterrent).
78. See infra notes 80-116 and accompanying text (discussing both theoretical and
empirical arguments in support of the law and economics inspired resurgence of the deterrence purpose of tort liability).
79. See infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text (discussing the theoretical arguments);
notes 93-116 and accompanying text (discussing the empirical findings).
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behavior will swing the balance towards retaining the traditional
rule.
A. Deterrence-TheoreticalArguments
Posner states that the major economic function of tort law and
the imposition of liability on tortfeasors is not compensation, but
rather the deterrence of inefficient accidents." Allowing the defendant in an accident liability case to use the victim's insurance as
an offset to the defendant's liability would decrease the deterrent
effect of liability on the defendant. For instance, if a defendant
were liable for $10,000 in damages, but the liability was offset by
the collateral benefits received by the plaintiff, then the defendant's
incentive to spend up to $10,000, discounted for the probability of
the accident occurring, would be reduced by this discounted value. 2 The view that tort law deters unsafe behavior to the full
economic extent of the tort liability can be called the "strong"
form of the deterrence argument.83
The critics of the strong form offer realistic objections to the
deterrent impact of liability. Such objections include: the deterrent
effect of other behavior controls besides tort liability, the diluting
effect of liability insurance on deterrence, the inability of liability
to deter unintentional behavior, and the psychological limitation of
individuals to properly perceive and respond to risks.'
The first objection, the existence of other behavior controls,
may raise the question of whether tort liability can be partially or
wholly supplanted as a deterrent. Parties who engage in unsafe
behavior may be deterred by other incentives such as moral obliga-

80. See POSNER, supra note 19, § 6.14; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901
(1979) (stating that deterrence of wrongful conduct is accorded at least equal importance
to compensation of harms caused as a purpose of tort law).
81. See POSNER, supra note 19, § 6.13.
82. See id.
83. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 378 (coining the weaklmoderate/strong nomenclature: the weak view is that held by collateral source rule opponents and tort law critics;
the moderate view is that the deterrent effect, while still an important aspect of tort liability, is somewhat mitigated by other factors). Shavell also supports the deterrent impact of
liability in the strong form. His determination of the effects of different liability schemes
rests on a measurement of total social welfare or utility that includes the full measure or
costs of liability on the decision whether to engage in risky behavior. SHAVELL, supra
note 68, at 5-46 (equating total social welfare to utility from engaging in behavior less
costs of taking care not to cause accidents less costs of accidents (tort liability)).
84. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 382-83.
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tions not to injure or by self-serving interests in personal safety.85
An example of the latter would be personal safety concerns that
prevent driving at excessive speeds when the risk to self is possibly greater that the risk to others. These other incentives, in and of
themselves, probably cannot prevent people from engaging in risky
behavior.
They can, however, supplement the efficacy of tort liabil6
ity.
The remaining objections to the deterrent effect of tort liability
reflect more on its effectiveness, when it is imposed, at deterring
unsafe conduct. Liability insurance may create a buffer between the
defendant and his tort liability obligations by shifting Posner's full
economic deterrent pressure from the tortfeasor to the liability
insurer.87 If a defendant simply relies on an insurer to fulfill the
liability, then the defendant has not faced any of the monetary
penalties imposed by the jury that supposedly create a deterrent
effect. The actual functioning of liability insurance coverage, however, may offset this shifting effect through the operation of deductibles, caps, and experience rating pricing mechanisms which
shift the costs of tort liability back to the tortfeasor.88 While liability insurance probably does reduce the full impact of tort liability for defendants, thereby eroding Posner's "strong" deterrent theory, the threat of increasing rates and incurring fixed and unavoidable costs certainly has an important impact on activities.
Since negligent torts are by definition committed unintentionally, it is argued that mental awareness of tort liability cannot deter
someone from unintentionally causing an accident. 9 Inadvertent
behavior, however, can be somewhat modified by certain precautionary choices: fixing a broken stairway in the case of homeowner
negligence, engaging in proactive informed consent in medical
malpractice, or improving compliance with manufacturing safety

85. See Sugarman, supra note 72, at 561-64 (concluding that there would be a gap between how people would act under only these constraints and what is socially desirable,
but arguing that tort law fails to fill in the remaining deterrent incentive).
86. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 384.
87. See Sugarman, supra note 72, at 573 (explaining that complete liability insurance

protection shifts the direct economic insurance pressure of tort law from the tortfeasor to
the insurance companies).
88. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 385 (noting that insurance premiums rise for those
who drive negligently). But see Sugarman, supra note 72, at 577-81 (arguing that despite
the potential deterrence-inducing mechanisms available to insurers, their actual use and
resulting impact on risky behavior is minimal).
89. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 383, 385-86.
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regulations in product defect cases.' These actions may not prevent accidents, but they will help prevent the portion of accidents
that has an inherent element of preventability.
In addition, although some individuals may be aware of tort
liability possibilities and may even affirmatively attempt to reduce
risky behavior, they are unable to perceive the true risk level and
cannot take the optimal level of precautionary measures.9 Again,
this mitigating factor is probably subject to offsetting considerations
that will retain some of the deterrent impact of liability. In fact,
the inability to assess risks properly may lead to an equal amount
of overestimation or underestimation. However, if there is an
awareness of the possibility of liability, there may be incentives to
become educated about the risk levels. These incentives include the
liability if risks are underestimated and the waste of resources if
risks are overestimated. 92
B. Deterrence-EmpiricalEvidence
The question of whether tort liability deters socially unacceptable risky behavior is also an empirical one. Although this is a
difficult measurement to make, attempts have been made to measure the decrease in accidents due to the imposition of liability.93
More interesting, though, are studies that show increased accidents
when liability is partially removed. Such is the case when no-fault
automobile insurance regimes are instituted.94 As mentioned earlier, empirical studies in this area are scarce, the results subject to
heavy criticism, and the conclusions perhaps unpersuasive. This
difficulty of proof, however, may not be fatal to the argument to
preserve the collateral source rule.
An example of whether the imposition of liability changes
behavior is the extent to which physicians have gone in order to
reduce medical malpractice liability.95 If the argument is that tort

90. See id. at 386.
91. See id. at 386-87; see also Sugarman, supra note 72, at 569-73 (suggesting that
many firms and individuals intentionally discount the risks of tort liability due to the
inability of the tort system to assess the correct penalties; the fact that the potential gains
from acting dangerously may outweigh the risks; and the small percentage impact even

large tort liability may have on large corporations).
92. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 387.
93. See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 102-116 and accompanying text.
95. See generally Schwartz, supra note 30, at 397-404.
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law does not deter tortious behavior due to the buffer of liability
insurance, then it would follow that physicians would not undertake
precautions to prevent malpractice. Schwartz provides many examples of how liability pressures have increased activity by the medical profession to reduce accidents. Some examples include increased under-age-forty glaucoma testing,96 increased awareness of

requirements to notify potential victims of dangerous patients,97
increased efforts to improve patient informed consent procedures
and standardize physician utilization of the process,9" and increased awareness of surgical tools left in patients. 9 These are
specific examples of heightened awareness due to publicized cases.
Data also exists showing general attempts to improve the standard
of care prompted by the increasing threat of liability and rising
malpractice insurance premiums."re These procedural changes support the moderate deterrent effect argument. The specter of tort
liability has helped increase the awareness and prevention of unsafe
activity in medical procedures.
The second and more interesting type of empirical measurement that highlights the deterrent effect is whether there is an
increase in risky behavior when tort liability is removed. ' A
common area of study on this issue is whether the imposition of
no-fault automobile insurance causes an increase in accidents or
fatalities. Either the strong or moderate form of deterrence would,

96. See Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (holding doctors liable for
malpractice as a matter of law for not testing for glaucoma during a routine eye examination).
97. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (requiring therapists to warn potential victims of patients' intent to harm them).
98. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781-92 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing the
evolution of the physician's duty to adequately inform his patient).
99. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 399.
100. See id. at 402 (quoting significantly from PAUL C. WElLER, ET AL., A MEASURE
OF MALPRACMCE 733 (1993) (indicating that liability, along with continuing medical education, peer review, and practice guidelines, is a factor in determining a doctor's standard
of care)). There is no doubt that potential liability has greatly increased the practice of
defensive medicine and added to skyrocketing health care costs. See id. at 402. This problem is, however, beyond the scope of this Note. The focus is rather on the ability of
potential liability to encourage doctors to take these precautions at all in the light of the
counter-argument that liability insurance dampens the deterrent effect of tort liability.
101. The elimination of the collateral source rule can be compared to the elimination of
tort liability generally. Although the use of a setoff rule for collateral benefits would only
reduce a defendant's liability to the extent of the benefits received by the plaintiff, the
reduction of the deterrent effect would be similar. The magnitude of the reduction may be
smaller, but it would be a reduction nonetheless.
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in theory, indicate that moving from a fault-based system of accident liability to a no-fault system would result in reduced safety
precautions by drivers and an increase in accidents. This would
result from decreased incentives to drive carefully in the absence of

liability.
This theory has generally held true. In a study that is often
quoted, Elisabeth Landes showed that a $1,500 liability threshold,
below which claims for damages must enter the no-fault first party
insurance compensation scheme, "implies an increase in fatal accidents of more than 10 percent!"'" Landes performed a regression
analysis on fatal accident rates for the period 1967-76 in states that
enacted no-fault automobile insurance. °3 The study's intent was
to isolate the effect on fatal accident rates due solely to the advent
of no-fault insurance. If the ten percent figure is accurate, then
aside from the serious policy implications on no-fault plans, the
study supports a more general theory that in the absence of tort
liability, more accidents occur due to the decreased deterrent effect

of that liability.
Landes' study, however, has been criticized. Jeffrey O'Connell
and Saul Levmore criticized Landes for her methodology."° They
faulted her use of fatal accidents instead of injuries from accidents
as a focus of study, her hypothetical driver who "superrationally"
discounts his own injuries while being fooled by liability thresholds
into driving less carefully, and her omission of many other impor-

tant variables.

5

102. Elisabeth M. Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effects of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49, 62 (1982)
[hereinafter Landes, The Effects of No-Fault].
103. See id. at 59. Landes' calculations accounted for such variables as population,
population density, variances in medical costs across states, each state's dollar threshold to
bar tort recovery, age, sex, race, and the dramatic effect on the amount of driving due to
gasoline price changes in the early 1970s. See id.
104. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Saul Levmore, A Reply to Landes: A Faulty Study of NoFault's Effect on Fault?, 48 MO. L. REV. 649 (1983).
105. See id. at 650-52 (stating that since fatal accidents produce tort claims in all nofault plans, the study should have concentrated on injury causing accidents where the
boundaries of no-fault may encompass the claims; that such a hypothetical driver is technically inconsistent; and that omitted variables included weather, police enforcement, road
quality, and medical care). Landes' stated reason for using fatalities is that the data is
much more reliable. See Landes, The Effects of No-Fault, supra note 102, at 57-58 & 58
n.10. See also Sugarman, supra note 72, at 588-89 (partially rejecting O'Connell and
Levmore's criticisms of Landes' study and offering as an alternative conclusion that instead of driving less carefully in no-fault states, drivers are simply driving more in the
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Since Landes' study, other economists and statisticians have
attempted to prove or disprove similar hypotheses with mixed
results. A 1986 study by Paul Zador and Adrian Lund, sponsored
by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, directly attacked
Landes' methodology and came to the conclusion that "[m]ultiple
regression analyses ...provide[s] no support for the claim that the
adoption of no-fault laws that restrict the liability for pain and
suffering increased the frequency of fatal motor vehicle crashes." 6 However, a 1994 study by Frank Sloan found that barring
twenty-five percent of tort liability claims through a no-fault program increases the fatality rate by eighteen percent.0 7 Although
Landes' results may have been reincarnated by Sloan's studies, the
empirical side of the deterrence question is not satisfactorily answered by these studies.'
As Sloan indicated, the United States may not be the ideal
case study for the no-fault question."° The 1978 implementation
of a no-fault insurance plan in Quebec may provide better data for
such a study since that plan provides for unlimited out-of-pocket
losses and entirely does away with tort liability for personal injuries."'0 Statistical studies of the Quebec plan will thereby avoid
the threshold problem in United States studies where tort liability
is retained above a certain nominal dollar amount. The studies on
the Quebec plan more conclusively show that the removal of the
deterrent of tort liability increased the accident rate.

absence of liability).
106. Paul Zador & Adrian Lund, Re-Analyses of the Effects of No-Fault Auto Insurance
on Fatal Crashes, 53 J. RISK & INs. 226, 234 (1986) (including data collected through
1980 and criticizing the statistical methodology of Landes' study, not her choice of variables).
107. See Frank A. Sloan et al., Tort Liability versus Other Approaches for Deterring
Careless Driving, 14 INT'L RV. L. EcON. 53, 66 (1994). Sloan concludes that overall,
tort liability has a deterrent effect on careless driving. See id. at 68. However, he conceded that the United States "is not the ideal location to study the effects of no-fault laws."
Id. at 69.
108. It is interesting to note that at the time her study was published, Landes was
associated with the University of Chicago. See Sugarman, supra note 72, at 588 n.147.
The law and economics school of thought, centered at the University of Chicago with
Richard Posner and William Landes, clearly supports tort law as a deterrent. Additionally,
the Zador-Lund study was supported by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, a
group that would probably support no-fault insurance.
109. See supra note 107.
110. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 395.
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In his study of the Quebec plan, Marc Gaudry found that fatal
accidents increased by seven percent, injury-only accidents increased by twenty-six percent, and property damage-only accidents
by eleven percent."' Rose Anne Devlin was even more conclusive than Gaudry. She argued that regardless of an accident reporting effect, fatal accidents, which cannot be falsified or avoided, increased by almost ten percent in Quebec after the passage of the
no-fault insurance regime in 1978.112 Devlin has also published a
report that attaches dollar values to the added accidents and compares them to the administrative savings from the additions of nofault in Quebec.113 She concluded that the increase in accidents
under no-fault cost $24714 million as compared to administrative cost
savings of $94 million.
These somewhat surprising statistics highlight one of the
much-criticized features of no-fault insurance plans. No-fault insurance plans wholly ignored the deterrent impact of tort liability,
attempted to decrease the overall costs of the accident compensation system by reducing transaction costs, and focused on increasing the availability and affordability of insurance." 5 The plans
may have made insurance more available and affordable, but if the
statistics cited above are believed, then the plans failed in even
maintaining the level of accidents. If the increased accident costs
were lower than the decreased transactions costs combined with the
benefits of improved coverage, then the no-fault plans may have
been justified. However, as the broad cost-benefit analysis of the
fault to no-fault shift in Quebec shows, that was not the case.

111. Marc Gaudry, Measuring the Effects of the 1978 Quebec Automobile Insurance Act
with the DRAG Model, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE ECONOMICS 471, 491 (Georges
Dionne ed. 1992) (indicating that other mitigating factors such as increased reporting practices under no-fault insurance and adverse risk selection by forcing young drivers to insure and therefore drive more may mitigate these increases).
112. Rose Anne Devlin, Liability versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An
Analysis of the Experience in Quebec, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO INSURANCE ECONOMICS 499,
513-14 (Georges Dionne ed. 1992) (concluding that "[a] no-fault system . .. severs the
link between compensation for an accident and amount of driving care").
113. Rose Anne Devlin, Some Welfare Implications of No-Fault Automobile Insurance,
10 INT'L REv. L. ECON. 193 (1990).
114. See id. at 198-99. These computations were based on Gaudry's results in his study
on the increase in accidents, see supra note 111 and accompanying text, but could equally apply to Devlin's own results.
115. See POSNER, supra note 19, § 6.14.
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The arguments in favor of retaining the collateral source rule
surely benefit from these studies.'1 6 If a setoff statute were used,
then the deterrent effect of tort liability would be reduced by the
extent of the setoff. A setoff statute of that type would, in effect,
create a no-fault regime for tortfeasors who are lucky enough to
injure insured victims.
This may seem like a return to the "whose windfall is preferable" refrain, but it is not. The deterrent impact of tort liability will
support placing liability on the tortfeasor in order to reduce the
level of risky behavior and thereby reduce the cost of accidents.
Although the mitigating factors, especially the dampening effect of
liability insurance, may refute the strong theory of deterrence, there
is no reason to believe that the moderate form of deterrence is
harmed. A moderate form of deterrence may not alone be enough
to support tort liability and the collateral source rule in the face of
critics. It is, however, an additional factor that can help swing the
balance in favor of retaining the collateral source rule.
V. COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES

Probably the most persuasive argument against the collateral
source rule is that it overcompensates the plaintiff by creating a
double recovery." 7 Admittedly, this argument is appealing. As
this section will show, however, it may have limited applicability
in some cases.
The double recovery argument applies most strongly to a case
in which an injured person receives compensation for damages
without paying premiums for the contractual right to receive the
compensation. The double recovery argument would also be
strengthened if this gratuitous compensation returns the injured
person to the precise condition before the accident occurred. In
such a case, the additional recovery from the torffeasor would be a
windfall to the injured person. There is no doubt that he has recovered twice for his injuries and has actually reaped a profit from
becoming injured. If the only purpose of imposing liability on the
tortfeasor was to fairly compensate injured parties, then additional
compensation in such a limited case would be an inefficiency in

116. See supra note 101 (comparing the creation of a collateral source setoff statute to
the removal of tort liability as in the case of no-fault insurance plans).
117. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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the tort system. However, as this Note proposes, the allocative and
deterrent purposes of the tort system must be considered when
assessing the overall impact of this inefficiency argument in light
of the collateral source rule debate."' It is possible that the inefficiency of a plaintiff's double recovery is met or exceeded by the
benefits of the allocative and deterrent impact of imposing tort
liability on the injurer. If so, then retaining the collateral source
rule would be beneficial, even though it produces some compensation inefficiencies.
In addition, the increased use of subrogation or reimbursement
rights by first-party insurers against tortfeasors, with a concerted
effort to reduce the transaction costs of these arrangements, will
significantly decrease the inefficiencies of double or multiple recovery by the plaintiff. 9
Before subrogation is considered, this Part will focus on two
factors that mitigate the double recovery inefficiency and decrease
the likelihood of the existence of a perfectly and freely compensated plaintiff who has received a double recovery. These factors may
help tip the balance so that the allocative and deterrent purposes of
tort law outweigh the compensation inefficiencies. These factors are
the nature of the insured's contract with the insurer and the extent
to which tort damages can truly compensate for tort injuries.
A. Benefit of the Bargain
Critics of the collateral source rule contend that the rule turns
the insurance contract into a wager of the premium for a chance at
double recovery. 20 If an insured acted out of prudence and foresight in obtaining the insurance, then the only reasonable expectation would be to receive the insurance benefits and no more. The
collateral source rule, however, allows insureds to add a tort judgment to their insurance benefits.
The main opposition to the wager-for-double-recovery argument is that the plaintiff's contract with the insurer is just that, a
contract. 21 Since the private contract with the insurer is separate
118. See supra notes 60-76 and accompanying text (discussing the allocation of resources purpose of tort liability); see also supra notes 77-116 and accompanying text (discussing the deterrence purpose of tort liability).
119. See infra notes 158-195 and accompanying text (discussing improvements to subrogation and reimbursement procedures).
120. See Brief of Anicus Curiae Defendant-Appellee at 22, Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633
N.E.2d 504 (Ohio 1994).
121. See Jacobsen, supra note 7, at 531-32 (pointing out that the plaintiff receives the
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and distinct from the plaintiff's tort relationship with the tortfeasor,
the plaintiff's right to recover damages from the tortfeasor via the
legal process should not be disturbed by a collateral source setoff
statute." Of course, the plaintiff can also contract not to receive
both the insurance proceeds and damages from the defendant via a3
subrogation or reimbursement clause in the insurance contract.'2
Since many insurers do include these types of clauses in their
policies, it may seem a moot argument for the victim to assert the
contractual right to receive both the insurance proceeds and damage
awards. However, insureds prefer insurance contracts with subrogation costs due to lower premiums.'24 Therefore, the insured's
right to choose which type of policy to enter into, to the extent
that this is possible, is the right that is protected when the collateral source rule is retained.
Additionally, the insurer has already been paid, ex ante, by the
plaintiff to provide benefits in case of injury."z If the defendant
also has a liability insurer who will pay the damages to the plaintiff, then this insurer also has already been pre-paid. These insureds
have both paid a premium equivalent to the amount the insurers
must pay to the insureds, discounted by the risk of the loss occurring. This shifts the loss to the insurers. Insurance companies do
business by assuming many risks of loss, with the knowledge that
a majority of them will not materialize. Paying benefits to an insured when a loss occurs is simply a cost of doing this business. A
collateral source setoff statute operates to relieve the defendant's
insurer from paying the plaintiff's damages and the insurer is relieved of the duty of paying benefits for which the insurer has
already been compensated and has previously contracted to pay.
insurance benefits not because of the injury-causing accident, but because of the contract,
paid for by the insurance premiums, which entitles him to the right to receive the benefits).
122. See John Barrow, The Contracts Clause and the Collateral Source Rule, TRIAL,
July 1988, at 33, 36 (arguing that if the plaintiff's benefits are paid under a

nonsubrogated insurance contract that was entered into before the statutory elimination of
the collateral source rule, denying the plaintiff full damages would impair the plaintiff's

vested property rights obtained when the insurance contract was executed). The flaw in
this argument is that a setoff statute would not disturb the plaintiff's contractual right to
receive insurance benefits, it would only disturb the plaintiff's tort rights.
123. See infra notes 139-157 and accompanying text (discussing subrogation). In fact,

Shavell contends that both the insurer and insured will prefer insurance contracts with
subrogation rights. See infra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
124. See SHAVELL, supra note 68, at 235-40.
125. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 63, at 252-53; POSNER, supra note 19, § 6.14.
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The operation of a new collateral benefit setoff rule clearly gives
the defendant's liability insurer a windfall that it did not expect
when it wrote the defendant's liability insurance policy.
As mentioned earlier,126 opponents of the collateral source
rule contend that the insured is wagering with the pre-paid contract
that he will be injured by a solvent tortfeasor, thus giving the
insured a double recovery. Under the indemnity theory of insurance
law, 27 insurance benefits should only compensate for the loss
suffered by the insured. If an injured person has a claim against
the tortfeasor for his loss, then the indemnity theory would hold
that there were actually no losses for which the insurer should pay
benefits. The indemnity theory arose with clear policy considerations against using insurance contracts as wagers since this would
create an "evil" incentive to destroy property or lives in order to
recover insurance benefits.'2
Under this pure indemnity theory of insurance, in a system
where the collateral source rule operates to give a double recovery
for injuries, there is no doubt that an insured is wagering so he
can receive both insurance benefits and damages from a tortfeasor.
He would be foolish not to make this wager since there is always
the possibility of being injured by an insolvent tortfeasor or in a
true accident. Those opposed to the collateral source rule contend
that insureds wager with insurance policies in order to receive
double recoveries. This contention is not persuasive because it is a
financial necessity to provide oneself and one's family with insurance coverage.
In addition, if an insured is said to be wagering with an insurance contract that the loss will occur, then it can also be said that
the insurance company is wagering that the loss will not occur.
Although both parties hope that the accident will not occur, only
the insurance company is doing so through purely monetary objectives, 29 since a non-occurring loss is one less income statement
debit entry for the company. In that sense, as between the two
parties, the insurance company's wager is even more tainted than
the insured's wager. The insured may be wagering on the contract,

126. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
127. See KEETON & Wmiss, supra note 28, § 3.1(c).
128. See id.
129. Even if the insured is wagering, he probably is not hoping to be injured due to a
fear of pain and the inconvenience of recuperation.
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but he is also buying security against monetary loss by shifting the
risk of a loss to a party that is less risk-averse.13 °
B. Ability of Tort Damages to Compensate
As has already been conceded,"' if collateral benefits received by a victim fully compensate for damages, then the double
recovery argument is fairly strong. The conditional assumption that
the benefits were fully compensatory, however, is as strong and
misleading. It is true that the pecuniary damages incurred, such as
medical costs and lost earnings, can be fairly compensated through
collateral sources. If a jury awards damages solely on the belief
that the plaintiff suffered only previously compensated pecuniary
damages, then the double recovery argument, in its strong form,
would justify offsetting this award with collateral benefits received
by the victim. The array of alternative damages potentially available to a plaintiff,' however, shows that the tort system recognizes that many other types of injuries can be incurred that are not
traditionally covered by insurance benefits.'
In a case where the jury knew the exact cost of insured medical expenses incurred and provided a categorized award, it would
be easy to determine the jury's intent and compute a setoff. The
Sorrell case, however, is an excellent example of a setoff provision
frustrating the intent of the jury. Ms. Sorrell was awarded damages
for medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering.' 34 The

130. See SHAVELL, supra note 68, at 186-205 (discussing the allocation of risk and the
theory of insurance).
131. See supra, Section V, para. 2.
132. Such alternatives include damages for pain and suffering, loss of future earning
capacity, loss of consortium by the family, and punitive damages. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 905(b) and comment, 906(c), & 908.
133. These losses are very difficult to measure. See POSNER, supra note 19, §§ 6.11-.12
(discussing damages for loss of earning capacity and for pain and suffering); SHAvELL,
supra note 68, at 134 (discussing the difficulty of estimating nonpecuniary losses). The
question of what value to place on human life or pain and suffering is a difficult one. It
can be given to a jury to draw on its collective life experiences. See Ingber, supra note
64, at 778 & n.26 (stating that courts rely on juries to quantify such intangible injuries
using their "enlightened conscience" and their "good sense and good judgment as men
and women of affairs"). In contrast, this question can be totally ignored by the court and
nothing is awarded. See POSNER, supra note 19, §§ 6.11-.12 (explaining the difficulty of
valuing the loss of future enjoyment of life, or hedonic damages, and loss of future earnings of children). It is clear though, that allowing juries to award nonpecuniary damage
awards, even high awards, is a valued and traditional part of our tort system.
134. See Sorrell v. Thevenir, No. 91 CA 4, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 5098, at *2 (Gallia
Cty. Sept. 30, 1992).
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sum of these damages was actually less than the amount of
worker's compensation benefits she and her medical provider had
received for her pecuniary losses only. It is difficult to understand
how the jury handled Ms. Sorrell's pecuniary damages. If it is
assumed, however, that they were not aware of the worker's compensation benefits she received, due to the inadmissibility of collateral benefits evidence, their low estimate of the cost of medical
care is understandable. The jury's intent was clear, however, in that
they wanted to award Ms. Sorrell $5,000 for pain and suffering. 3 The effect of the Ohio setoff statute in this case would
have totally setoff the sum of Ms. Sorrell's pecuniary and nonpecuniary jury awarded damages. This is true since the statute does
not differentiate between or attempt to align the setoff between
similar collateral insurance benefits and jury awards. The jury's
pain and suffering award could have been nullified by the statute.
Indeed, the plaintiff in Sorrell argued that the benefits
should cor1 36
respond to the jury awards that are being reduced.
If a solution to the double recovery problem is still called for,
a better setoff statute would more clearly align the insurance benefits received with the corresponding component of the jury award.
If medical expenses or lost wages were paid by collateral sources,
then the setoff for these benefits should only apply to a jury award
that specifies these two types of damages. As the statute in Ohio
was originally crafted, total collateral benefits are subtracted from
total compensatory damages.137 Since this could interfere with a
jury's award of non-economic damages such as for pain and suffering, simply limiting the setoff to identifiable economic damage
awards would solve the problem.1 3 1 In the Sorrell case, if this
limitation were imposed, the jury's pain and suffering award would
have been left intact. Ms. Sorrell's $15,000 of worker's compensation benefits would have only offset the jury award for medical
expenses and lost wages and she would have received the $5,000
in pain and suffering damages that the jury deemed that she had
incurred. Unless an economic-award-only setoff provision is incor-

135.
136.
(Ohio
137.
138.
setoff

See id.
See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 11-15, Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504
1994).
See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.45(B)(2)(c)(i) (Banks-Baldwin 1995).
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a (West 1991) (limiting the collateral source
to economic damages).
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porated into these setoff statutes, the value of jury compensation
for non-economic damages will be seriously compromised.
VI. SUBROGATION & EFFICIENCY PROPOSALS

A. Subrogation-Background
Subrogation has been recommended as a solution to the double recovery problem that arises under the operation of the traditional collateral source rule.'39 Subrogation is the legal or contractual right of an insurer to substitute itself in place of its insured
in regard to some or all of the insured's rights to recover damages
from the defendant. 1" In a case such as Sorrell, if the insurer
providing benefits was subrogated to the plaintiff's right of recovery, the insurer could bring suit on its own behalf, or on behalf of
the plaintiff, in order to recover damages from the defendant. The
defendant would pay the benefits directly to the insurer as reimbursement for the insurance benefits paid to the plaintiff.'
Hence, there would be no double recovery by the plaintiff and the
insurance industry would have only paid one set of benefits to the
victim. Specifically, the defendant's liability insurer would pay the
tort judgment to the plaintiff's insurer. Extensive use of subrogation by insurers, along with continued operation of the collateral
source rule, would solve the double-recovery problem and still promote the allocative and deterrence purposes of tort liability.
There are, however, a few difficulties with subrogation that
result in it not being used without exception in insurance contracts.
Traditionally subrogation has been limited to property insurance
policies and has had limited application in personal medical bene-

139. See Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What Its Effect Would
Be On American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CoRNELL L. REV. 1339, 1347

(1994) (presenting variations on the collateral source rule under possible future tort law
regimes).
140. See KEfrON & WIDISS, supra note 28, § 3.10(a)(1); see also Spencer L. Kimball
& Don A. Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MICH. L. REV. 841 (1962).
141. See KEETON & WiDIss, supra note 28, §§ 3.10(b)(1), 3.10(c)(1) (discussing an
insurer's right and ability to bring suit on its own or on the insured's behalf and various
methods of allocating tort judgments to insured and insurer under a subrogation
agreement).
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Subrogation procedures are also extremely expen-

sive in relation to the benefit they give to insurers.143
In spite of these problems, both supporters 1" and oppo-

nents 45 of the collateral source rule have offered subrogation as
a solution to the double recovery problem. In light of the allocative
and deterrent benefits presented in this Note that favor the continued use of the collateral source rule, the increased use of subroga-

tion in conjunction with the collateral source rule would limit the
double-recovery problem as well as preserve the benefits of the
rule. Schwartz's call to investigate the feasibility of subrogation
should be pursued in order to determine if the benefits of the
collateral source rule justify retaining the rule.1" This Note proposes that subrogation can be beneficial to insurers, insureds, and
society as a whole due to the allocative and deterrence effects of

full tort liability.

142. See id. at § 3.10(a)(7) (explaining that subrogation rights were denied due to rules
against the assignability of causes of action for injury to another person); see also
Kimball & Davis, supra note 140, at 860-61 (explaining that the traditional objection to
legal subrogation in medical benefit cases is that, absent an express contract provision,
insurance of a personal nature cannot be subject to subrogation by the insurer). But see
Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 362 N.E.2d 264, 265-66 (Ohio 1977) (holding that a subrogation clause is enforceable in a medical benefits case, and reflecting the trend towards
alloxqing subrogation in these insurance contracts). Smith is representative of the trend
towards including subrogation provisions in many medical insurance policies, including
Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 28, § 3.10(a)(7).
143. See Wilbur C. Leatherberry, No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Will the Poor Pay
More Again?, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 101, 150 (1975); see also Jeffrey O'Connell, A
Proposal to Abolish Contributory and Comparative Fault, With Compensatory Savings by
also Abolishing the Collateral Source Rule, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 591, 604-05 (supplying
selected subrogation cost statistics, showing the minute percentage of losses subrogation
actually recovers for the insurer, and arguing for the elimination of subrogation due to the
expense of the process).
144. See Schwartz, supra note 139, at 1347 (calling for further investigation into the
costs and application of subrogation rights).
145. See Gobis, supra note 13, at 890; Schafer, supra note 23, at 590. In fact, Ohio
R.C. § 2317.45 provides exemption from the setoff statute to plaintiff's insurers who have
legal or contractual "rights of recoupment" from the defendant. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.45(B)(2)(a)-(b) (Banks Baldwin 1995). This preserves the subrogation rights of the
insurer and recognizes the ability of these rights to limit the double recovery. But see 2
ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 170-71, 17782 (1991) (arguing that the use of subrogation, with or without a traditional collateral
source rule, is prohibitively expensive and difficult to enforce due to legal and practical
restraints).
146. See Schwartz, supra note 139, at 1348-49 (criticizing the ALI REPORTERS' STUDY,
supra note 145, as "premature in writing off.., subrogation" and inviting regulators and
scholars to continue a costlbenefits analysis of subrogation).
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On a theoretical level, the argument that subrogation is beneficial is well supported. Posner contends that insurers should be able
to contract for the right to be reimbursed for benefit payments
made to their insureds when the insured has recoverable rights
against a third party. 47 In addition, the insurers could demand
that the insured assign her legal rights against the tortfeasor to the
insurer. 48
Shavell agrees and, in fact, contends that both insurers and
insureds will prefer insurance contracts giving subrogation rights to
the insurer. 49 This is so because the existence of subrogation
rights in insurance policies is socially optimal. Insureds as a group
will gain more utility from lower premiums than from a few possible double recoveries from defendants and insurers will be able to
recover portions of the judgment from the defendant.' 50 In addition, an insurer's subrogation rights will prevent inappropriate
incentives for the insured to cause or fabricate losses to effect a
double recovery.' Shavell recognizes the limitations of legal restraints on subrogation, the doubt that it actually lowers premiums,
and the increased transaction costs due to a rise in subrogation
litigation. He argues, however, that these constraints work against
both the insured and insurer. 52 In light of the efficiency gains of
subrogation to both parties that Shavell discusses, both parties have
incentives to overcome these limitations.
The general legal constraints against subrogation in health and
medical insurance policies are eroding.'
Clauses granting such
rights to insurers are becoming more and more common in other
types of insurance policies. In fact, there is even some support for
allowing subrogation to life insurers,"54 an area that has tradition-

147. POSNER, supra note 19, at § 6.13 (arguing that premiums would be less where the
insured would be required to assign any legal rights from the injury to the insurer).
148. See id
149. See SHAVELL, supra note 68, at 235-40.

150. See id. at 236.
151. See id. at 237.
152. See id. at 237-38 (arguing that the increased cost of litigation and transaction costs
due to subrogation litigation is a problem that may be difficult to resolve, but that these
are not inherent problems of subrogation; rather, they are a reflection of the justice system as a whole).
153. See supra note 142.
154. See George S. Swan, Subrogation in Life Insurance: Now is the Time, 48 INS.
CouNsEL J. 634 (1981).
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ally disallowed subrogation. 155 The increased use of subrogation
clauses would obviate the need for collateral source setoff statutes
and allow for free operation of the collateral source rule without
the maligned double-recovery problem.
Given the support of economic theory and relaxation of subrogation's legal constraints, the problem on a more practical level is
how to promote the efficient use of subrogation. If the costs of
subrogation are too high, or if its use is limited, then the benefits
of imposing full liability on tortfeasors and their insurers will be
outweighed by the costs of subrogation and the continued inefficiency of double recovery. If Professor Schwartz' mandate to investigate the costs and benefits of subrogation before completely
eviscerating the collateral source rule is to be followed, 156 then
serious attempts to install a cost-effective and pervasive subrogation
program should be undertaken. This Note proposes that a statutory
solution can address the inefficiencies of tort compensation through
enforcement of subrogation rights. Without statutory impetus, or at
least a consideration of the policies underlying such a proposal,
insurers will not have the incentive to push subrogation as a solution to the double-recovery problem. Instead, insurers will rely on
the expensive and spotty process that is now in place. Pointing to
the "evils" of double recovery and the costs of the current subrogation practice, insurers instead will continue pushing for statutory
revision of the collateral source rule and other tort reform measures.
Set out below are the various issues to be considered and
addressed by a statutory reform of subrogation procedures. 57 The
main topics to be addressed include coordination between plaintiff
and defendant's insurers, allocation of subrogation recovery between plaintiff and his insurer, attorney's fees, mandatory arbitration, and possible procedural changes to combine arbitration with
speedier subrogation recovery by first-party insurers.

155. See KEErON & WIDiss, supra note 28, § 310(a)(6).
156. Supra note 146 and accompanying text.
157. This proposal only generally addresses these issues. Different insurance programs
such as worker's compensation, social security, MedicarelMedicaid, automobile, medical
and health, malpractice, and general liability may require individualized analysis.
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B. Coordination of Tort Judgment or Settlement
Before an injured insured even enters the tort system, the
inefficiencies of compensation have already been encountered. In
many cases, a victim may be over-compensated by excess insurance coverage or by insuring with more than one insurer. 5 The
multiple-compensation problem is mostly addressed by insurers'
increased use of "Other Insurance" clauses. Until multiple recoveries from different insurers are eliminated, however, the insurance
industry can hardly complain of the tort system's double-recovery
problems.
Insurer's attempts to coordinate insurance benefits can easily
be adapted and applied to the enforcement of subrogation agreements by the insurer against other insurers. 59 The legal mechanisms that promote the coordination of insurance benefits and contractually limit coverage for the benefit of the insurer can similarly
be used to give the insurer the contractual right to recover part of
the tort judgment. These mechanisms are already in place in insurance policies that include subrogation clauses. However, the problem of promoting the information exchange and extending the use
of these provisions remains.
An objection to relying on subrogation as a remedy for double
recovery, even when it is permitted by law and included in the
insurance contract, is that monitoring lawsuits and securing reimbursement at their conclusion is too expensive. This precludes
158. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 28, § 3.11(d) (discussing the reluctance of
courts to deny insureds multiple coverage and basing this tendency on policy borrowed
from the traditional collateral source rule). However, the trend is increasingly towards
enforcing insurers' "Other Insurance" clauses which serve to limit multiple coverage. See
id. § 3.11(a)(1) & (d); see also Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for
Illness and Injury, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 75, 94-98 (1993) (describing the United States
system as a web of various compensation schemes, including both cause- and fault-based
systems, with a complex coordination of benefits between the different systems based on
these types of clauses).
159. See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 158, at 116 (linking the loss compensation
system to a cost-accounting mechanism which simply bundles its claims for reimbursement
against liability insurers for more efficient loss-cost transfer). The proposal to more closely

enforce subrogation rights just as multiple insurance provisions are enforced may have
limited applicability where the insurer is actually involved in the tort dispute. In that case
the resolution of fault issues will force the insurer to incur litigation costs that probably
exceed those found in "Other Insurance" clause disputes. However, multiple insurance
disputes which require dispute resolution are also common. See KETON & WIDISS, supra
note 28, § 3.11(d).
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enforcement in cases involving small sums."6 As inefficient as
small-claims enforcement may be, it does not change the fact that
the mechanisms that monitor and prevent double insurance coverage could just as easily be used for subrogation monitoring purposes as well. The costs involved in monitoring tort suits would seem
to parallel, and not exceed, the monitoring costs for double insurance coverage. The cost/benefit ratio of enforcing subrogation
rights for small sums would probably be similar to enforcing "Other Insurance" clauses; this is something that the industry seems
perfectly willing to do.
If the goal of increased subrogation is to decrease double
recovery costs to the industry, then defendants' liability insurers,
who often also write first-party coverage, will have an economic
incentive to cooperate and ensure that the plaintiff's insurer is
reimbursed. Offsetting this cooperative incentive is a collusive
incentive between the defendant's insurer and the plaintiff to
preclude the plaintiff's insurer's subrogation rights by entering a
secret settlement. By not notifying the plaintiff's insurer of the
settlement, the two parties could divide the subrogation recovery
among themselves. The defendant's insurer would pay out less and
the plaintiff would receive more under this secret settlement.
In order to promote the reimbursement of the plaintiff's insurer and to avoid this type of collusion, a statutory escrow or trust
arrangement could be utilized. 16 The liability insurer would hold
the portion of the judgment or settlement corresponding to the
benefits paid by the insurer. 62 In addition to the overall economic incentives of full reimbursement, statutorily requiring a liability
insurer to hold that portion of the judgment deemed pecuniary
would give the liability insurer the incentive to investigate any
pending subrogation rights. This investigation would not necessarily
be extensive, and placing the burden of a reasonable inquest on the
escrow agent would avoid any possibility of collusion.

160. See 2 ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 145, at 170.
161. See id. at 178-80 (questioning the desirability of this arrangement due to possible
conflicts of interest among the parties). But if the industry-wide interest in promoting
subrogation is considered, the defendant's insurer will be more likely to participate in this
type of arrangement on a reciprocal basis among all insurers.
162. In order for the escrow agent to be able to retain the judgment or settlement proceeds for the first-party insurer's recovery, the judgment or settlement would have to
resemble a jury special verdict form. The award would have to be specifically segregated
into pecuniary (reimbursable) and nonpecuniary damages.
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If the defendant's insurer does not fulfill this imposed duty,
the plaintiff's insurer's remedy would be full reimbursement from
the defendant's insurer regardless of whether the plaintiff had received funds nominally representing the plaintiff's insurer's subrogation fund. This remedy is consistent with placing the investigatory and escrow burden on the defendant's insurer. Before entering
into a settlement with the plaintiff, the specter of paying twice for
the compensatory damages, once to the plaintiff and again to the
plaintiff's insurer, will cause the defendant's insurer to investigate
the existence of subrogation rights of the plaintiff's insurer.
C. Allocation of Tort Judgment or Settlement
Once the industry has protected itself against multiple payments through a pervasive coordination of benefits program, and
the subrogation funds are held in escrow, the question will remain
as to how to allocate these funds among the insurer, the insured,
and the insured's attorney.
Of course, the first-party insurer will have an interest in recovering the full amount of medical expenses or lost wages paid.
This may not be a problem in jury trials where these items are
often presented to the jury for easy inclusion in a special jury
verdict. The more difficult problem is in the settlement arena
where the negotiations often involve total dollars and not categorical damages.'63 In that case, if a settlement is reached for less
than the plaintiff's claimed total damages, including pain and suffering, then reimbursing the insurer for total benefits paid would
leave the plaintiff's pain and suffering damages less than fully
compensated. Conversely, reimbursing the insurer with only a portion of total benefits paid would not give full effect to the subrogation agreement." 6 In the interest of facilitating administration
and predictability, these types of allocation conflicts should be
resolved either by the insurance contract subrogation agreement or
by statute.

163. See 2 ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 145, at 180 (discussing the settlement

with subrogation conflict and suggesting that there is no suitable solution); see also
KEETON & WDiss, supra note 28, § 3.10(b)(1)-(4) (outlining three main subrogation
allocation methods, suggesting that not one of the three is used predominately, and indicating that the result reached is often a compromise between the insurer and insured).
164. See 2 ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 145, at 180.

1110

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1075

There are three basic methods for allocating recovery when
the total settlement fund is not sufficient to reimburse the insurer
and fully compensate the plaintiff: (1) insurer reimbursement first;
(2) proration of third party recovery between insurer and insured in
proportion to percentage of total original loss compensated by the
insurer; and (3) insured reimbursement for total loss first.1 65 A
simple example should illustrate these methods more clearly. As a
result of a third-party's negligence, a victim incurred $10,000 of
insured medical expenses and $20,000 in pain and suffering. If the
plaintiff settled the claim for a flat $20,000, then under the first
allocation option the insurer would be fully reimbursed and the
victim would be undercompensated by $10,000. The second option,
proration of the $20,000 settlement fund, would give one-third to
the insurer and two-thirds to the victim.' 66 Under the third option, the victim would be fully compensated, but the recovery fund
would be fully depleted, barring the insurer's recovery.
None of these solutions is satisfactory in light of the conflict
between full compensation and subrogation recovery mentioned
above. The second option, proration, may intuitively be the best
solution since in the absence of an express contract provision it
would be the most likely result of an arm's-length negotiation
between the parties." A problem arises, however, due to the difficulty in measuring the relative value of the insured's pain and
suffering damages at the settlement stage without the jury's verdict.1 68 As a result of this difficulty, the plaintiff will have an incentive to overstate a claim for these damages to obtain a greater
share of a proration allocation.
In order to avoid the inevitable conflicts of interest and disputes between insurer and insured over the intangible damages, the
first allocation method, fully reimbursing the insurer first, should
be used. Not only does this eliminate any possible conflicts and
provide full subrogation recovery, it also recognizes that medical
costs are much more definite and predictable than pain and suffering damages. These damages may turn on the whim of a jury or

165. See KEETON & WiDiss, supra note 28, § 3.10(b)(1).
166. The one-third/two-thirds proration results from the original ratio of benefits received

to total injury (20,000/30,000).
167. See KEETON & WiDiss, supra note 28, § 3.10(b)(1).
168. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of jury special
verdicts specifically segregating the award into pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages).
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the settlement negotiation prowess of the plaintiffs attorney. Statutorily providing for this option will further streamline the subrogation process from a dispute standpoint and create foreseeable and
certain results.
D. Attorney Fees
Another problem that will arise when an insurer seeks reimbursement from a tort judgment or settlement relates to the exact
amount that the insurer should expect to receive. The insurer will
claim the full amount of the benefits it paid to the insured. If the
plaintiff's attorney has done all of the work in obtaining the award,
however, he will certainly demand a reasonable fee. If this fee
demand is paid, it will most likely decrease the insurer's recovery.
This creates a conflict between the basic goal of fully reimbursing
the insurer from the tort judgment and giving the plaintiff, or more
likely his attorney, the incentive to essentially do the insurer's job
of subrogation recovery.
These opposing goals are difficult to balance. If the insurer is
fully reimbursed, then it has received a windfall from the plaintiff's
attorney's hard work. This is a windfall because the insurer would
have expended its own legal costs to obtain the subrogation recovery if the insured had not retained his own attorney. In the interest
of the overall goal of streamlining the process of subrogation, there
is no reason that this problem has to be left to hardball negotiations between the insurer and the plaintiff's attorney. The fee rate
for subrogation recovery to be paid by the insurer can be set out
in the subrogation clause of the insurance contract or it can be
statutorily mandated.169 The fee for this type of arrangement
could be set at a "reasonable" level to correlate with the level of
the plaintiff's attorney's fees in that case. On the other hand, in the
interest of providing fuller reimbursement, the rate could be a
lower set rate, ranging from ten to twenty percent. It may seem
like the plaintiff's attorney is unjustly benefiting from any added
fee, but if it is realized that the insurer would have to expend

169. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-311 (Michie 1995). This Virginia Worker's Compensation statute provides that the attorney's fees for subrogation recovery by the plaintiff
on behalf of the insurance carrier are to "be apportioned pro rata between the employer
[insurer] and the employee." § 65.2-311. If a plaintiff's attorney's standard fee is one-third
of the recovery, then the insurer's subrogation recovery is decreased by one-third.
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similar amounts to recover on its own, then the fee-shifting onto
the insurer is just.
E. Arbitration
The discussion to this point has assumed that the insurer is
not actively involved in the plaintiff's lawsuit. This may not be
very realistic since in a limited number of cases with large subrogation recoveries at stake the insurer will be directly involved with
70
the litigation or settlement process to protect its own interests.
This scenario may create many problems including conflicts of
interest between the insurer and insured. However, the problem to
be addressed is containing subrogation costs. With the addition of
the insurer/subrogee, these costs now include direct litigation costs.
These costs are a burden on the insurer and should only be viewed
as a detriment to the subrogation process. It may seem that since
the insurer is enforcing its right to recover sums from the defendant, the insurer should bear the burden of finding ways to limit
these costs or to more economically make the decision whether to
become involved in the litigation.' The goal, however, is to encourage more subrogation through more efficient processes. If the
insurer needs to be involved in the litigation, then faster, more efficient methods should be used so as to decrease the total subrogation costs.
Arbitration and other forms of alternate dispute resolution are
commonly used in insurance litigation. 72 Arbitration agreements
between insurers provide many benefits including quicker resolution
of conflicts, lower costs than standard trials leading to lower insurance premiums, more informal settings that provide a more conducive atmosphere to conflict resolution, and an easing of the

170. "[A]sserting a subrogation right is usually viewed as 'standing in the shoes' of the

insured so that the insurer's rights are equal to, but no greater than, those of the insured." KEaFON & WIDISS, supra note 28, § 3.10(a)(1).
171. In the litigation setting, the plaintiff's insurer may be at the mercy of the defendant's insurer in terms of limiting costs and speeding up the process. However, intra-industry cooperation via information exchange and statutory escrow agents, and the realization that the insurers are repeat players in this context should lead to a more efficient
process. See supra notes 158-162 and accompanying text.
172. See William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLuM. L.
REV. 1705, 1732 n.135 (1992) (indicating that informal inter-company settlement procedures are used extensively in automobile collision litigation); Schwartz, supra note 139, at
1348 (stating that major Southern California auto insurers have entered into an "intercompany arbitration agreement" to keep down costs on subrogation claims).
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caseloads of overburdened courts. 3 Clearly, arbitration of disputes involving subrogation recoveries by insurers has benefits in
excess of simply reduced litigation costs. Arbitration is not costfree, however, and these costs must be taken into account when
making the subrogation cost/benefit analysis.
Arbitration between insurers can be statutorily mandated.174
When arbitration is required, whether in all cases or under a
threshold-type statute such as New York's, insurers will have more
incentive to efficiently utilize the process to their advantage. As
repeat players in such an informal setting, with the added possibility that the same insurer may have both subrogation payouts and
recoveries in the same venue, the arbitration option is ideal for
encouraging the intra-industry cooperation needed to reduce subrogation costs.
F. Arbitration Plus Allocation of Tort Judgment or Settlement
As discussed earlier, the allocation of an award between insured and an insurer with subrogation rights can be fraught with
difficulties. 7 5 The case becomes even more complicated when the
insurer is a party to the litigation. Whether in early negotiation,
arbitration, or even at trial, the insurer's interests may conflict with
those of the insured. Depending on the method of recovery allocation used, the insurer may be more or less willing to settle than
the insured.176 This conflict is especially acute when the plaintiff
is seeking large pain and suffering damages from the defendant.
The plaintiff is less concerned about the subrogation recovery since
that money will be paid to the insurer in either case." If the

173. See Gerald Asken, Arbitration of Automobile Accident Cases, 1 CONN. L. REV. 70,
71, 76-78 (1968); see also ARITRATION: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE, AND TORT
CLAIMs 215-341 (Alan Widiss ed. 1979) (discussing both policy and practical considerations of arbitration for various types of insurance and tort disputes).
174. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 5105 (McKinney 1985) (including a section of the
motor vehicle insurance statute entitled "Settlement between Insurers" and providing arbi-

tration as the sole subrogation recovery remedy for the payer of first-party benefits against
the insurer of the third-party tortfeasor). This New York statute also implements a threshold where arbitration is only available if the defendant was driving a truck over 6500

pounds or a bus. See § 5105.
175. See supra notes 163-169 and accompanying text.
176. If insurer first, then the insurer will quickly settle. If insured first, then the insurer
will press the litigation on until it reaches full compensation.
177. The plaintiff would be concerned if an insurer-first or proration-allocation method
was being used and the judgment or verdict possibilities seemed below actual damages
because the plaintiff would be undercompensated in those cases.
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plaintiff seeks pain and suffering damages, and the insurer reimbursement, then the plaintiff's interests could be compromised. This
may happen if the insurer's attorney was also representing the
plaintiff, or if the insurer's attorney was controlling the case.
In this scenario, it makes sense to bifurcate the proceeding
into a insurer's cause of action for subrogation recovery and a
plaintiff's cause of action for pain and suffering damages. The
insurer's action would be statutorily limited to mandatory, nonbinding arbitration.'7 8 The plaintiff would have the option of utilizing the same arbitration proceeding, a separate arbitration panel,
179
or resorting to a traditional trial resolution.
1. Benefits of Arbitration and Bifurcated Proceedings
The benefits of bifurcating the proceedings and more fully
utilizing arbitration would include the possibility of full and speedy
subrogation reimbursement. It would be simple for the insurer to
prove the amount of benefits paid to the insured. In the arbitration
setting, in addition to the normal arbitration savings, procedural
relaxations would reduce evidentiary proof to the simple introduction and verification of the insurer's benefit payments. Since the
insured is not involved in this proceeding, except possibly as a
witness, the conflict of interest consideration would not come into
play. There would be no award allocation problems since the insurer would directly receive reimbursement for benefits paid. Also, the
insurer would not have to pay the insured's attorney fees for obtaining the recovery. Undoubtedly, the insurer will have its own
legal fees; however, in-house counsel would surely cost the insurer
less than the plaintiff's attorney.
The plaintiff would also benefit from this arrangement. First,
the potential absence of the insurer from whatever option the plaintiff chooses would eliminate the conflict of interest problems for
the plaintiff as well. The plaintiff and his attorney would be free to

178. See supra notes 172-74.
179. This option prevents violating the plaintiff's constitutional right to a jury trial or
equal protection rights. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Oaxo CoNST. art. 1, § 5. Although mandatory, non-binding arbitration has been found to be constitutional, requiring
only the insurer to submit to arbitration sufficiently addresses the need to reduce subrogation costs. See, e.g., Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 424 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio 1981) (holding
Ohio's medical malpractice mandatory arbitration statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2711.21 (Baldwin 1981) (amended to non-mandatory in 1987), constitutional against due
process and equal protection challenges).
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determine the viability of the suit without outside pressure from the
insurer.
Second, the plaintiff could also benefit from the parallel proceeding in his own arbitration or trial. The plaintiff's compensatory
damages would have already been established in the insurer's arbitration. The plaintiff could use the already proven damages at the
later trial to help establish the underlying basis for his nonpecuniary damages. As a result of the bifurcated causes of action, the
plaintiff would be barred from recovering these compensatory damages. ' ° In addition, since the arbitration proceeding would presumably have included a fault determination by the arbitrators, this
determination could potentially be introduced as evidence at the
jury trial.18' With both compensatory damages and fault established, the plaintiff's proceeding would be even more streamlined
and consist mainly of a trial for nonpecuniary damages.
Third, not losing sight of the larger picture, if subrogation is
streamlined by this procedural bifurcation, all insureds should theoretically benefit from lower premiums. This is simply a corollary
benefit from the increased efficiency of arbitration." 2
2. Problems with Arbitration and Bifurcated Proceedings
Bifurcated proceedings and additional arbitration would surely
have their difficulties. Obviously, adding another layer of litigation
seems counter-intuitive to the goal of reducing costs and streamlining the subrogation process. However, this may only apply to the
overall cost of litigating the entire dispute. The costs relating to the
actual insurance subrogation will be greatly reduced by limiting it
to early arbitration. The cost to the plaintiff of independently
mounting an additional lawsuit may add another layer with some
duplicative costs. But if the plaintiff can utilize the compensatory
damage and fault findings from the earlier arbitration hearing," 3

180. It may be beneficial to allow the plaintiff to present the compensatory damages as
if the plaintiff were trying to recover them. This recognizes the evidentiary concerns
raised in traditional collateral source rule operations. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. If successful, the plaintiff would simply deduct this amount from the verdict

before the defendant paid the award.
181. It is also possible that the issue of fault could be conclusively determined at the
arbitration. The plaintiff would not have to reprove the issue; the defendant could simply
stipulate to the earlier finding. See infra notes 184-195 and accompany text (discussing

collateral estoppel concerns).
182. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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not all the costs will be duplicative. In addition, without the presence of his insurer and the possible conflicts of interest, it will be
easier for the plaintiff to decide whether to further pursue the
defendant.
As the plaintiff attempts to utilize findings from the prior
proceedings in his own trial, the procedural hurdle to overcome is
collateral estoppel. 8 4 An underlying policy of collateral estoppel
is to reduce litigation costs by preventing multiple litigation on the
same issue. Generally, collateral estoppel would work to the benefit
of the plaintiff in this type of case. The plaintiff would offensively
assert collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation of the issues determined in the arbitration.18 Precluding relitigation of these issues
would clearly fulfill the primary policy of collateral estoppel: reducing litigation costs and increasing subrogation efficiency.
Before the plaintiff can successfully assert collateral estoppel,
a number of aspects of the proposed bifurcated proceeding, which
cut against allowing collateral estoppel, must be addressed. First, in
order to preclude the liability insurer from relitigating the fault
issues, the burden of proof and the rigidity with which factual
findings are made must be the same between the two proceedings."8 6 Clearly this requirement is not satisfied as between a traditional arbitration hearing and a full jury trial. An arbitration hearing has more relaxed evidentiary procedures, and the arbitrators
tend to make compromised determinations that blur factual determi-

184. The law of collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of matters that have already
been determined in order to preserve judicial resources, foster reliance on the finality of
judicial decisions, and reduce the possibility of inconsistent decision. See JACK H.
FR]EDENTHAL ET AL., Civi. PROCEDURE § 14.9 & n.2 (2d ed. 1993) (quoting Montana v.
U.S., 440 U.S. 147 (1979)). There may be a question of whether a non-judicial proceeding such as arbitration is subject to collateral estoppel. Arbitration findings, however, have
often been subject to the doctrine. See G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REv. 623, 649 (1988).
185. In a bifurcated proceeding such as the one proposed, if the defendant's liability
insurer received an unfavorable fault determination in the arbitration proceeding, he would
attempt to relitigate the issue of fault before the jury in the later proceeding. The offensive use of collateral estoppel by the plaintiff, however, would prevent the defendant and
the defendant's insurer from relitigating an issue that had already been determined. See
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-32 (1979) (distinguishing offensive and
defensive collateral estoppel, promoting the use of offensive collateral estoppel when judicial efficiency was not harmed, but warning of possible abuse by plaintiffs who vexatiously increase litigation via the use of collateral estoppel).
186. See FkiEDENTHAL, supra note 184, § 14.10.
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nations.' 7 A full jury trial, on the other hand, consists of the familiar onerous evidentiary procedures. However, the distinctions between the two types of proceedings can be decreased by requiring
the arbitrator to make more rigid evidentiary findings and to clearly state the basis for those findings.
Second, under the collateral estoppel doctrine of mutuality,
only parties involved in the prior proceeding may take advantage
of its determinations.' 8 Since the plaintiff was not a party to the
arbitration, this would seem to allow the liability insurer and the
defendant to relitigate the issues of fault and even damages. However, adherence to the doctrine of mutuality has been eroding
steadily as many courts have expanded the notion of privity to
enable a greater binding effect of the prior determination." 9 Parties are deemed to be in a privity relationship when they have
interests which are so intertwined that a decision involving one
should necessarily bind or benefit the other.' 9° This enhanced
view of privity requires an analysis into whether the non-party's
interests were fully represented in the prior proceeding.1 9 In the
proposed bifurcation, the likely similarity of interests (both parties
have similar interests in damages and fault) indicates that plaintiff
and the plaintiff's insurer should have privity. l The plaintiff
will be able to take advantage of the prior damage and fault determinations by offensively asserting collateral estoppel against the
defendant and the defendant's insurer.
Identity of interests between plaintiff and insurer does not
fully satisfy a proposal to grant privity to the plaintiff in order to
utilize the previous findings. Arbitration is significantly different
from litigation in that the fact-finding process can vary widely and
the arbitrator's findings are often "unexplained and difficult to

187.
188.
(such
(such
cause

See Shell, supra note 184, at 632-33.
See FRiEDENTHAL, supra note 184, § 14.14. Collateral estoppel can benefit parties
as the plaintiff in this case) or it can bind a party to a previously adverse finding
as the defendant here). The defendant cannot assert that he cannot be bound behe is a party to both proceedings. The defendant can only assert that the plaintiff

should not benefit since the plaintiff was not involved in the prior proceedings.
189. See id;see also Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 328 (approving the use of collateral
estoppel in case where strict mutuality requirements are not met).
190. See FPEDENTHAL, supra note 184, § 14.13.
191. See id. § 14.13-.14.

192. An insured will not want privity with the insurer when the arbitration findings are
adverse since the plaintiff will be bound by the findings. However, the plaintiff should
not be able to choose when he is or is not bound by the arbitration proceedings.
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interpret."' 93 The defendant and liability insurer will certainly object to the use of these findings in a later proceeding where they
can present the same evidence to a jury and subject it to more
rigorous screening processes. These are important differences and
ideally the gap between the two processes should not be so wide.
However, the policy considerations of decreasing litigation costs
and determining these issues early 19 4 outweigh any prejudice to
the defendant.
In addition, the policies that support utilizing arbitration to
reduce subrogation costs also clearly support precluding costly
relitigation on the same issues in a later trial. The defendant's
insurer may argue that he is prejudiced by this preclusion. However, if the cooperative interests in seeing subrogation costs reduced are recognized, then the defendant's insurer will also want to
conclude the issue
as early as possible through collateral estoppel
19 5
issue preclusion.
Since the insurer's sole subrogation remedy of arbitration has
already been established, there are few other substantial statutory
provisions required to effectuate this bifurcation. The plaintiff's
right to continue on his own behalf is well-settled, and the procedural issues of collateral estoppel are best left to judicial determination and party negotiation as outlined above.
Since entering the subrogation process in the first place is
discretionary in cases where the insurer determines it would be
uneconomical to recover small amounts or where the defendant's
fault was in serious doubt, the insured's claim against the defendant for insured compensatory damages would be valid until the
insurer's subrogation rights had been settled by arbitration. This
will return the proposal to the traditional starting point: the plaintiff

193. Shell, supra note 184, at 659.
194. See id. at 660 (explaining that these fundamental interests are shared by both the
arbitration and litigation systems).
195. Arbitration is essentially a contractual issue even if mandated by statute. See id. at
661-63. The defendant's and plaintiff's insurers will have an interest in agreeing on the
extent to which each side will be bound in the later proceedings. Recognition of these
contract principles provides great flexibility to a court to delve into the intent of the parties as to whether certain issues would be precluded by the arbitration. Since, theoretically, both parties to the arbitration are interested in reducing the total costs of subrogation, this flexibility will be utilized by the parties to achieve this cost reduction by limiting issue reitigation as much as possible. See id.
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will be able to bring suit for full pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages, just as with the traditional collateral source rule.
CONCLUSION

This Note discusses whether the collateral source rule is justified in light of modem theories of tort law. In recent years the rule
has received much attention from commentators since it seemed
antiquated and at odds with the evolving theory of tort law. In
addition, the insurance industry has lobbied the state legislatures to
ease the burden on the industry and help control runaway liability
insurance premiums. The collateral source rule was an easy target
for these initiatives. Moreover, the public perception that plaintiffs
were receiving exorbitant damages awards, due in part to the rule,
led to the passage of many tort reform packages that eliminated the
collateral source rule. The rule was replaced with setoff provisions
by which defendants could reduce their liability by the amount of
insurance received by the plaintiff.
The collateral source rule debate is hardly over. Many states
have not changed the traditional rule and some that have changed
it have had the statute overturned by state supreme courts. Parties
to this debate should take a more careful look at the purposes of
the tort system and the large impact a change in the collateral
source rule will have.
This Note presented three main areas of consideration in support of retaining the rule. First, if the collateral source rule is
changed, the ability of society to effect, via price mechanisms, the
correct levels of safe or valuable behavior will be impaired. Second, the notion that the deterrent impact of tort liability is outdated and serves no purpose in modem society is no longer uncontested in the current literature. Empirical evidence, while still hotly
debated, shows that the deterrent impact of tort liability still has a
place in the modem tort system. Third, a collateral source setoff
provision can seriously impair the rights of injured parties to enjoy
the contractual benefits of insurance as well as their rights to be
compensated completely and effectively by the tort liability system.
In recognition of the conflict between the benefits of the collateral source rule and the drain on the insurance industry caused
by overcompensated plaintiffs, this Note proposes a pervasive program of increased use of subrogation. Subrogation is currently used
by insurers to reduce their costs, and its efficiency can also be
used to reduce the costs of overcompensation. If subrogation can
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be utilized to its full potential, then the collateral source rule can
survive tort reform and the benefits of placing full tort liability on
the parties that cause injuries can be retained.
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